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Due to Csiszár and Körner, the private capacity of classical wiretap channels has a single-letter characteri-
zation in terms of the private information. For quantum wiretap channels, however, it is known that regular-
ization of the private information is necessary to reach the capacity. Here, we study hybrid classical-quantum
wiretap channels in order to resolve to what extent quantum effects are needed to witness non-additivity
phenomena in quantum Shannon theory. For wiretap channels with quantum inputs but classical outputs, we
prove that the characterization of the capacity in terms of the private information stays single-letter. Hence,
entangled input states are of no asymptotic advantage in this setting. For wiretap channels with classical
inputs, we show by means of explicit examples that the private information already becomes non-additive
when either one of the two receivers becomes quantum (with the other receiver staying classical). This gives
non-additivity examples that are not caused by entanglement and illustrates that quantum adversaries are
strictly different from classical adversaries in the wiretap model.
1 Introduction
In contrast to its classical counterpart, non-additivity phenomena of entropic expressions already make
an appearance in some basic settings of quantum Shannon theory. This includes the quantum capacity [1,
2], the private capacity [3, 4], and the classical capacity of quantum channels [5]. One of the most vexing
such problems was posed by the additivity conjecture for the Holevo information [6]. Hastings disproved the
conjecture with an example in which using entangled inputs to a quantum channel boosts the rate at which
information can be transmitted [5].
Here, we investigate private communication over wiretap channels to understand the essential quantum
properties needed for entropic channel capacity formulas to become non-additive. Originally introduced by
Wyner [7], a wiretap channel WBC |A has one input system A for Alice and two outputs B and C to Bob and
Charlie, respectively. The goal is then to transmit classical information represented by some finite message
set M = {1, ...,m} from Alice to Bob, using a channel coding scheme of block size n with encoder E and
decoder D such that Bob can make a reliable inference Mˆ about the transmitted message M , without any
information leaking to Charlie. More precisely, the probability of error P{mˆ 6= m} should be small for all m, say
P{mˆ 6= m} ≤ ǫ for some ǫ ∈ (0,1). Moreover, Charlie’s outputs for each m should be nearly indistinguishable.
Taking the general case of quantum state ρm
C
for input m, we require 1
2
‖ρm
C
− σC‖1 ≤ ǫ for some σC and
all m ∈ M , where for simplicity we take the same parameter ǫ (see, e.g. [8, Chapter 23]). A given coding
scheme of size n and parameter epsilon has a rate R(n,ǫ) = 1
n
log |M |, and the supremum of achievable rates
for integer n and ǫ ∈ (0,1) defines the capacity P(W).
In this work, we are interested in whether the private capacity P(W) has a single-letter expression in terms
of the private information
P1(W) :=max
pV ,ρ
v
A
I(V : B)ω − I(V : C)ω (1)
with ωVBC :=
∑
v
pV (v)|v〉〈v|V ⊗WBC |A
 
ρv
A

. (2)
Here, pV is a probability distribution over an auxiliary random variable V and ρ
v
A
is a quantum state condi-
tional on the value of V and with support on A. For quantum wiretap channels, the private capacity is known
to be characterized by the regularization of the private information [9, 10], i.e.
P(W) = lim
n→∞
1
n
P1(W
⊗n) . (3)
This is precisely how the analysis proceeds in the case of classical wiretap channels as well, but Csiszár
and Körner [11] further showed that the private information is additive. That is, we have P1(W1 ⊗W2) =
P1(W1) + P1(W2) making the regularization unnecessary. Our main result in this paper is that if two of the
parties in the wiretap channel are chosen to be classical, then P(W) = P1(W) when the input is quantum,
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while there exist channels for which P(W) > P1(W) if either output is quantum. Hence, in this scenario
neither do entangled inputs allow for non-additivity effects to occur, nor are they necessary for them!
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we fix our notation, and in Section 3 we
examine general properties of wiretap channels and the private information. In particular, we show that one
can always take |V | ≤ |A|2 in the private information optimization (1). Then we show additivity for quantum
inputs in Section 4 and give the non-additive examples in Section 5 and Section 6.
2 Setting
2.1 Systems
Quantum systems are denoted by A,B,C and have finite dimensions |A|, |B|, |C |, respectively. Quantum states
are linear, positive semi-definite operators of trace one and denoted by ρA ∈ D(A), where the subscript denotes
the support of the operator. Quantum states ρA ∈ D(A) are called pure if they are of rank one, in which case
we also write ρA = |ψ〉〈ψ|A. Quantum channelsWB|A from A to B correspond to completely positive and trace-
preserving maps from the linear operators on A to the linear operators on B. Classical systems are denoted by
V,W,X ,Y, Z and have finite dimensions |V |, |W |, |X |, |Y |, |Z|, respectively. Classical states are density matrices
diagonal in the computational basis {|x〉〈x |}x∈X and denoted by ρX ∈ D(X ). Classical channels from X to Y
correspond to conditional probability distributions pY |X (y |x), but may also at times be denoted by NY |X , with
the support indicating the classical domain and target. The notation Xm = (X1, ...,Xm) denotes an m-tuple of
registers and will be used in the context of channel coding to denote a code-block of length m that encodes a
logical system X .
2.2 Entropies
For ρABC ∈ D(ABC) and its reduced states, the entropy is defined as H(A)ρ := −Tr [ρA logρA] (where loga-
rithms are taken base 2), the conditional entropy of A given B as H(A|B)ρ := H(AB)ρ − H(B)ρ , the mutual
information between A and B as I(A : B)ρ := H(A)ρ+H(B)ρ−H(AB)ρ , and the conditional mutual information
between A and B given C as I(A : B|C)ρ := H(AC)ρ + H(BC)ρ − H(ABC)ρ − H(C)ρ . Here and henceforth
any quantum definition applies to classical probability distributions as well—by embedding them as matrices
diagonal in the computational basis {|x〉〈x |}x∈X .
2.3 Wiretap Channels
A wiretap channel is given by a quantum channel WBC |A with one sender Alice A and two receivers Bob B and
Charlie C , where Bob acts as the legitimate receiver and Charlie as the adversarial party. Note that we do
not require WBC |A to be an isometric channel (as often done in the literature), i.e. the channel to Charlie is
not necessarily the complement of the channel to Bob. We are then interested in hybrid classical-quantum
settings, where some of the systems are classical. This leads us to use the following definition:
Definition 1. A reductionWB|A (WC |A) of a wiretap channel WBC |A to the legitimate receiver (adversarial party)
is obtained by tracing out the adversarial party (legitimate receiver), i.e
WB|A(·) := TrC

WBC |A(·)

or WC |A(·) := TrB

WBC |A(·)

. (4)
We will denote wiretap channels with classical inputs asWBC |X :=WB|X /WC |X , indicating their construction from
their reductions via WB|X /WC |X :=
 
WB|X ′ ⊗WC |X ′′

◦ CX ′X ′′ |X , where CX ′X ′′ |X is a stochastic map that creates a
copy of the classical input system X .
We will consider reductions that are either fully classical channels or classical-quantum channels. From these,
we will then construct the following types of wiretap channels:
Definition 2. A quantum-classical-classical (qcc) wiretap channel with quantum sender Alice A, but classical
receivers Bob Y and Charlie Z is given by
WY Z |A(·) =
∑
y,z
Tr

Λ
y,z
A (·)

|y〉〈y |Y ⊗ |z〉〈z|Z (5)
with {Λy,zA }y,z forming a POVM, such that Λ
y,z
A ≥ 0 and
∑
y,z Λ
y,z
A = 1A.
This setting is notable because it allows for entangled inputs to the wiretap channel, but only separable
states at the outputs. It thus raises the question of whether using entangled input states can boost the rate
at which information can be transmitted, despite the fact that each reduction is an entanglement-breaking
channel.
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Definition 3. A classical-quantum-classical (cqc) wiretap channel with classical sender Alice X and classical
adversarial receiver Charlie Z, but quantum legitimate receiver Bob B is given by
WBZ |X (·) =
∑
x
〈x | · |x〉
∑
z
p(z|x)ρz
B
⊗ |z〉〈z|Z

(6)
for conditional probability distributions p(z|x) and quantum states ρz
B
.
Here, only separable states that are diagonal in the computational basis are allowed as inputs to the
channel, so one might think that the private information is additive in this case.
Definition 4. A classical-classical-quantum (ccq) wiretap channel with classical sender Alice X and classical
legitimate receiver Bob Y , but quantum adversarial receiver Charlie C is given by
WYC |X (·) =
∑
x
〈x | · |x〉
∑
y
p(y |x)|y〉〈y |Y ⊗ρ yC

(7)
for conditional probability distributions p(y |x) and quantum states ρ y
C
.
Again, one might expect the private information to be additive given that only separable states diagonal
in the computational basis are allowed for inputs. Some simple channels that we will employ to construct
wiretap channel examples are as follows. First, the binary symmetric channel with crossover probability p is
denoted BSC(p). It may also be thought of as a quantum channel NB|A(·) := (1− p)(·) + pX (·)X for the Pauli
X -matrix on system B. The binary erasure channel with erasure probability p is denoted BEC(p). Again a
fully quantum binary erasure channel NB|A may be defined by NB|A(·) = (1 − p)(·) + p|e〉〈e|B , where |e〉B is
orthogonal to A.
Definition 5. The binary pure state channel BPC( f ) with fidelity f is a classical-quantum channel NA|X with
pure state outputs |ψ〉〈ψ| and |ϕ〉〈ϕ|, such that f := |〈ϕ|ψ〉| and
|0〉〈0|X −→ |ψ〉〈ψ|A and |1〉〈1|X −→ |ϕ〉〈ϕ|A . (8)
3 Properties of the private information
To evaluate the private information for the case of classical inputs in later sections, we follow ideas from
the classical work [12] and start by rewriting
P1(W) = max{pV ,ρvA}
fW
 
EV

ρv
A

−EV

fW
 
ρv
A

with fW(ρA) := I(X : B)ω − I(X : C)ω , (9)
where ρA =
∑
x pX (x)|x〉〈x |A for {|x〉A} the eigenbasis of ρA, and ωXBC =
∑
x pX (x)|x〉〈x |X ⊗WBC |A (|x〉〈x |A).
This expression still holds for quantum inputs and is in general hard to evaluate, as the underlying optimiza-
tion problem is non-convex. However, we immediately have the upper bound
P1(W) ≤max
ρA
fW(ρA)−min
ρA
fW(ρA) . (10)
since the minimum of any function is a lower bound to its expectation value. Moreover, whenever fW ≥ 0
for all input states ρA, then minρ fW = 0, with any pure input state ρA = |x〉〈x |A being a valid minimizing
argument and hence
P1(W) = P0(W) :=max
ρA
fW (ρA) . (11)
We call wiretap channels W with fW ≥ 0 more-capable [13], where for the classical case this can be seen as
the sufficiency to choose V = X in (1). Whenever the function fW is concave, we call the wiretap channel
W less-noisy. Such channels are then in particular also more-capable and thus the optimization problem in
(11) becomes convex and therefore easily tractable. Contrary to the classical case, however, we do not know
if less-noisy wiretap channels have additive private information in general.1 We also have the notions of
anti-less-noisy and anti-more-capable wiretap channels, where the roles of the legitimate receiver Bob and
1Our definition of less-noisy and more-capable conflicts with Watanabe’s work for the quantum case [14]. He introduces a notion that
we might be tempted to call completely less-noisy and completely more-capable, as it involves the less noisy or more capable condition
applied to arbitrarily many instances of the channel. His notions are equivalent to ours for the classical case [13], and lead to an additive
private information.
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adversarial receiver Charlie are interchanged. Note that for anti-less-noisy channels P1(W) = 0, as well as
that for anti-more-capable channels P0(W) = 0. Finally, a well-known sufficient criterion for additivity of the
private information for general (i.e. not necessarily isometric) quantum wiretap channels, is degradability
[15–17]. That is, when there exists a channel EC |B such that WC |A = EC |B ◦WB|A. The private information is
also additive for anti-degradable channels, when there exists a channel FB|C such that WB|A = FB|C ◦WC |A.
However, then we immediately have P(W) = P1(W) = 0.
Next, we prove a cardinality upper bound for the private information.
Lemma 1 (Fenchel-Eggleston [18, Theorem 18]). Let S ⊆ Rn such that S =
⋃n
i=1
Si with Si connected. Then,
we have for every y ∈ conv(S) that there exists S′ ⊆ S with |S′| ≤ n such that y ∈ conv(S′).
Lemma 2 (Cardinality bound). Let registers V,Abe defined as in (1). Then, the maximization of (1) is achievable
using an ensemble over input states for which |V | ≤ |A|2. For classical input systems X the bound reduces to
|V | ≤ |X |.
Proof. Note that we can alternatively write (9) as
P1(W) = max{pV ,ρvA}
gW(EV

ρv
A

)−EV

gW (ρ
v
A
)

(12)
with gW(ρA) := H(B)W(ρ) −H(C)W(ρ), since
gW (EV

ρv
A

)−EV

gW(ρ
v
A
)

= H
∑
v
pV (v)ρ
v
B

−
∑
v
pV (v)H(ρ
v
B
)
−H
∑
v
pV (v)ρ
v
C

+
∑
v
pV (v)H(ρ
v
C
) . (13)
Then, following [19, Theorem 17.11] we consider the function h which maps any state ρ to its Bloch vector,
as well as the value gW(ρ). Recall that the Bloch vector has d
2 − 1 components, where d is the Hilbert
space dimension, and completely specifies the state ρ. Since h is continuous, the image S of the set of states
under h is a compact, convex, and connected set in Rd
2
. Now, suppose pV and ρ
v
A
are optimal, leading to an
average state ρA :=
∑
v pV (v)ρ
v
A
. By Fenchel-Eggleston’s strengthening of Carathéodory’s theorem, as given
in Lemma 1, h(ρA) can be represented as
∑d2
i=1
pisi for suitable probabilities pi and points si ∈ S. For each
i, the first d2 − 1 components of si specify a state ρi , while the last component is hW(ρi). Therefore, there
exists a random variable V ′ of cardinality d2 with pV ′(i) = pi and a preparation map P
′
A|V with P
′
A|V=i = ρi
which is also optimal. If we restrict the possible inputs to W to form a commuting set, i.e. diagonal in some
basis, then only d − 1 components are needed for the Bloch vector, and we recover the classical cardinality
bound |V | ≤ |X |.
4 Quantum Sender Alice
Here, we prove that the private information is additive for wiretap channels WY Z |A with quantum input
system A but classical output systems Y Z .
Theorem 1. Let W1 :=WY1Z1|A1 and W2 :=WY2Z2|A2 be two qcc-wiretap channels with quantum senders A1,A2,
classical legitimate receivers Y1,Y2 and classical adversaries Z1, Z2. Then, we have
P1(W1 ⊗W2) = P1(W1) + P1(W2) . (14)
Proof. The proof makes use of a variant of the classical key identity in [19, Lemma 17.12]. Suppose ρVA1A2 is
the optimizer in P1(W1⊗W2) and call the outputs Y1Y2 for Bob and Z1Z2 for Charlie. Let W1 :=WY1Z1|A1 and
W2 :=WY2Z2|A2 , then for the probability distribution pVY1Y2Z1Z2 =
 
WY1Z1 |A1 ⊗WY2Z2|A2

(ρVA1A2) we have
P1(W1 ⊗W2) = I(V : Y1Y2)p − I(V : Z1Z2)p (15)
= I(V : Y1|Z2)p − I(V : Z1|Z2)p + I(V : Y2|Y1)p − I(V : Z2|Y1)p (16)
≤max
z2

I(V : Y1|Z2 = z2)p − I(V : Z1|Z2 = z2)p

+max
y1

I(V : Y2|Y1 = y1)p − I(V : Z2|Y1 = y1)p

. (17)
The second equation follows using the chain rule for the conditional mutual information, while the first
inequality follows since conditioning is equivalent to averaging. Now, consider the first maximization, for
which we require the joint distribution pVY1Z1Z2 . Suppose the optimal input state has the form
ρVA1A2 =
∑
v
pV (v)|v〉〈v|V ⊗ϕvA1A2 . (18)
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BEC((1−r)2)
BPC(r) B
Z
X
WBZ |X [r]
Figure 1: The channel WBZ |X [r], composed of BPC(r) to Bob and BEC((1− r)2) to Charlie.
The channels are just measurements, so letting Λy1,z1 and Γ y2,z2 be the associated POVM elements forW1 and
W2 respectively yields
pVY1Z1Z2(v, y1, z1, z2) = pV (v)
∑
y2
Tr

(Λ
y1 ,z1
A1
⊗ Γ y2,z2A2 )ϕ
v
A1A2

. (19)
Now, define the normalized states σ
v,z2
A1
via
pZ2 |V=v(z2)σ
v,z2
A1
=
∑
y2
TrA2

Γ
y2,z2
A2
ρv
A1A2

, (20)
for pZ2|V the conditional distribution computed from the distribution pVY1Z1Z2 . Writing in the decomposition
pV (v) pZ2 |V=v(z2) = pZ2(z2) pV |Z2=z2(v), we obtain
pVY1Z1|Z2=z2(v, y1, z1) = pV |Z2=z2(v)Tr

Λ
y1,z1
A1
σ
v,z2
A1

. (21)
Thus, we have confirmed that when conditioning on the value of Z2, the outputs Y1 and Z1 are related to V
via W1 composed with a preparation channel PA1|V Z2 . Therefore, we have
max
z2
I(V : Y1|Z2 = z2)p − I(V : Z1|Z2 = z2)p ≤ P1(W1) . (22)
A similar argument holds for the second term, implying P1(W1⊗W2) ≤ P1(W1)+P1(W2). The other inequality
holds since, for the optimal ρV1A1 (ρV2A2) in P1(W1) (P1(W2)), the product state ρV1A1 ⊗ ρV2A2 is feasible in
P1(W1 ⊗W2) with V = (V1,V2).
Notably, this shows that entangled input states are of no use and gives a novel single-letter characterization
in quantum Shannon theory. Applying Theorem 1 inductively to (3) gives the following characterization.
Corollary 1. For quantum-classical-classical wiretap channels WY Z |A we have that P(WY Z |A) = P1(WY Z |A).
5 Quantum legitimate receiver Bob
Now let us turn to the question of classical inputs. By means of an explicit counterexample, here we show
that the private information is non-additive for wiretap channels WBZ |X with classical input system X and
classical adversary Z , but quantum legitimate receiver B. Hence, somewhat surprisingly, classical adversaries
already make classical-quantum channel coding amenable to non-additivity effects in the wiretap model. Note
that this is not the case for classical communication over classical-quantum channels, whose capacity has the
same single letter maximization of mutual information as the capacity for the purely classical channel.
Theorem 2. There exists a cqc-wiretap channel WBZ |X with P
 
WBZ |X

> P1
 
WBZ |X

.
In fact, we can construct a whole family of counterexamples, based on the parameterized wiretap channel
WBZ |X [r], whereWB|X [r] = BPC(r) andWZ |X [r] = BEC((1− r)2), as depicted in Fig. 1. We construct a simple
block preprocessing of a single bit input to two channel inputs using a parity code to show that the private
information of two uses of WBZ |X [r] is positive for some values of r for which the private information of a
single use is zero.
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Proof. First, we show that the private information P1
 
WBZ |X [r]

vanishes for channel parameter values r ≥ rˆ,
where rˆ ≈ 0.5424 satisfies
2rˆ2(rˆ − 2)
rˆ2 − 1 = log

1+ rˆ
1− rˆ

. (23)
Vanishing private information is the statement that the channel is anti-less-noisy, which is the case when
fW[r] : ρX → I(X ′ : B)ω− I(X ′ : Z)ω from (9) is convex. HereωX ′BZ =
∑
x pX (x)|x〉〈x |X ′ ⊗WBZ |X [r](|x〉〈x |X ).
AsWBZ |X [r] has binary input, the cardinality bound |V | ≤ 2 from Lemma 2 considerably simplifies the analysis.
In Appendix A we calculate the second derivative of fW[r] and find that it becomes positive for r ≥ rˆ.
To see that the private capacity is not zero for some r ≥ rˆ, consider the preprocessing map P based on
the n= 2 parity encoding, which maps
|0〉〈0|X −→
|00〉〈00|X 2 + |11〉〈11|X 2
2
and (24a)
|1〉〈1|X −→
|01〉〈01|X 2 + |10〉〈10|X 2
2
. (24b)
Due to symmetry, the rate 1
2
P1(WBZ |X [r]
⊗2 ◦ PX 2 |X ) of the combined preprocessing and wiretap channel
achieves the upper bound (10). The maximal input to f is the uniform distribution, and the minimal inputs
occur symmetrically at distributions (1− q,q) and (q, 1− q), for the appropriate value of q. This implies that
the optimal noisy preprocessing has a uniform V and PX |V given by BSC(q). As a concrete example, taking
r = 0.543 and q ≈ 0.2281 gives a rate of roughly 0.0003. This is a miniscule value, but positive.
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Figure 2: Plots of P1(WBZ |X [r]) and
1
2
P1(WBZ |X [r]
⊗2 ◦ PX 2 |X ) for coding over the WBZ |X [r] =
BPC(r)/BEC((1 − r)2) channel. Here, PX 2 |X is the parity-based pre-processing scheme defined in
(24). The inset plot shows that P1(WBZ |X [r]) vanishes for a threshold channel parameter value of
r ≥ rˆ ≈ 0.5424, while the rate for two channel uses remains positive for r up to roughly 0.545,
thus demonstrating non-additivity for the case of quantum Bob. The dot corresponds to the specific
example in the proof of Theorem 2.
It is interesting to note that noisy pre-processing is necessary for r near rˆ, as it can also be shown that
the channel is anti-more-capable for r larger than roughly 0.5342 (specifically, the solution of h2(
1−r
2
) =
r(2 − r), see Appendix A.2 for more details). On the other hand, neither pre-processing nor regularization
are necessary to evaluate the capacity for r less or equal than r˜ := 3−
p
5
2
≈ 0.3820, for in this parameter
region the channel is degradable. Degradability can in principle be determined by searching for a quantum
channel which transforms Bob’s pure state outputs to Charlie’s BEC outputs pointwise, i.e. an EZ |B such that
WZ |X [r](|x〉〈x |) = EZ |B◦WB|X [r](|x〉〈x |) for x = 0,1. This problem can be cast as a semidefinite program [20]
in the general case, but here we may appeal to the simpler necessary and sufficient conditions on the existence
of such a channel given in Theorem 6 of [20]. Indeed, since the outputs of WB|X [r] are pure, such a channel
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BPC(1−2p)
BSC(p) Y
C
X
WYC |X [p]
Figure 3: The channel WYC |X [p], composed of BSC(p) to Bob and BPC(1− 2p) to Charlie.
exists if and only if the fidelity between Charlie’s outputs is not smaller than Bob’s outputs. The fidelity of
Bob’s outputs is r, while for Charlie the fidelity is just the probability of erasure, (1− r)2. Equating these two
gives the threshold value r˜ = 3−
p
5
2 . We note that the particular degrading maps is given by the unambiguous
state discrimination measurement [21–23], whose failure probability is precisely the fidelity between the two
pure states.
Fig. 2 shows the regularized private information 12P1(WBZ |X [r]
⊗2◦PX 2 |X ) of this scheme, versus the private
information P1(WBZ |X [r]) of the bare wiretap channel. As in the proof, by symmetry the rates in each case
achieve (10), with the optimal maximal input to the respctive f the uniform distribution. In the language of
[12], both channels are “dominantly cyclic shift symmetric”.
6 Quantum adversarial receiver Charlie
Finally, we consider the case that the output to the adversarial receiver Charlie is quantum. Again by
means of a counterexample, we establish that the private information is generally non-additive for ccq wiretap
channels WYC |X with classical input system X and classical legitimate receiver Y , but quantum adversary C .
Hence, in the wiretap model, quantum adversaries are strictly different from classical adversaries in the sense
that non-additivity effects become possible.
Theorem 3. There exists a ccq wiretap channel WYC |X with P
 
WYC |X

> P1
 
WYC |X

.
Again we can construct a family of counterexamples, this time based on the wiretap channel WYC |X [p]
composed of BSC(p) to Bob and BPC(1 − 2p) to Charlie, as depicted in Fig. 3. We borrow the block pre-
processing based on the repetition code from [3] to find channels having positive private information under
the block pre-processing, but zero for a single use, as in the case of quantum Bob. In fact, this example is
implicit in [3], as WYC |X is the result of restricting the quantum channel considered there (the Pauli channel
with independent bit and phase errors at identical rates) to standard basis input states.
Proof. We first show that the private information P1
 
WYC |X [p]

vanishes for p ≥ pˆ, where pˆ ≈ 0.1241 satisfies
(1− 2pˆ)3
2pˆ(1− pˆ) = ln

1− pˆ
pˆ

. (25)
As before, this is established by showing that fW[p] is convex for p ≥ pˆ by direct calculation of the second
derivative. The details of the calculation are given in Appendix B.
To obtain lower bounds on the private capacity P(WYC |X [p]), we employ the block pre-processing from
[3], adapted to the channel setting. In particular, consider the pre-processing PX n |X [q] resulting from n-bit
repetition encoding followed by i.i.d. bit-flip noise addition at rate q by the sender. Denoting the input to the
pre-processing by X and bounding P0(WYC |X [p]
⊗n ◦PX n |X [q]) from (11) by choosing a uniform X , we find via
explicit calculation in Appendix C:
P(WYC |X [p]) ≥
1
n

I(X ′ : Y n)ω − I(X ′ : Cn)ω

(26)
=
1
n

1−
∑
sn2
p
 
sn
2

H(W |Sn
2
= sn
2
)−H

1
2ρ
⊗n
p,q
+ 12 Z
⊗nρ⊗n
p,q
Z⊗n

+ nH(ρp,q)

. (27)
Here, Sn
2
∈ {0,1}n−1 denotes the syndrome of the repetition code as obtained by the legitimate receiver, W is
the value of the logical bit error, and ρp,q is the output state of BPC(1−2p) for a zero-valued bit in the code-
block that has undergone the pre-processing bit-flip channel. This is precisely Eq. (2) in [3]. As numerically
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evaluated therein, the expression remains positive at least up to the threshold p¯ ≈ 0.129, which is obtained
from n= 400 and q = 0.32.
0.121 0.122 0.123 0.124 0.125
0
1
2
3
·10−3
channel parameter p
a
ch
ie
v
a
b
le
ra
te
BSC(p)/BPC(1− 2p)
n= 1
n= 3
0.124 0.1245
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
·10−4
Figure 4: Plots of P1(WYC |X [p]) and maxq
1
3
P1(WYC |X [p]
⊗3◦PX 3 |X [q]) for coding over theWYC |X [p] =
BSC(p)/BPC(1− 2p) channel. We refer to the main text for the definition of the pre-processing map
PX 3 |X [q]. The inset plot shows that the private information is zero beyond p = pˆ ≈ 0.1241, while the
achievable rate for three uses of the channel remains positive up to p ≈ 0.1245. This demonstrates
non-additivity for the case of quantum Eve.
In the context of key distillation, the threshold value pˆwas found by numerical optimization in [3, Footnote
21]. Furthermore, the wiretap channel WYC |X [p] becomes anti-degradable for p larger or equal to p˜ :=
2−p2
4 ≈ 0.1464, at which point we have P(WYC |X [p˜]) = 0. Again we make use of [20, Theorem 6] to establish
anti-degradability. Here Charlie’s states are pure, with a fidelity 1− 2p, while Bob’s states have a fidelity of
2
p
p(1− p). Equating these two gives the threshold p˜ = 2−
p
2
4 . The degrading map in this case is simply
the Helstrom measurement to distinguish the pure states [24]. This value is identical to thresholds found
in the upper bounds for key distillation [25–27] or private communication over the corresponding quantum
channel with independent bit and phase flip errors [17, 28]. Note that it remains an open question if the
private capacity is non-zero all the way up to the degradability threshold p˜.
In Fig. 4 we provide a comparison plot between P1(WYC |X [p]) and maxq
1
3P1(WYC |X [p]
⊗3 ◦ PX 3|X [q]) for
the n = 3 pre-processing scheme. We find a threshold of 0.1245, and perhaps coincidentally the optimal q
also appears to be 0.32 in this case.
7 Discussion
We determined for which cases the private information of hybrid classical-quantum wiretap channels is
non-additive. We found additivity violations when either of the two receivers becomes quantum; interestingly
without any entanglement being present. On the other hand, we also showed that for quantum inputs but
classical receivers the private information remains additive. That is, entangled input states are of no help.
We note that the setting in [3] is already an instance of non-additivity without entangled inputs, because the
combination of repetition coding and standard basis inputs produces separable states. This is precisely what
we use in Section 6. Moreover, we can regard the parity encoding in Section 5 as a phase error-detecting code
with stabilizer XX , since this operator also stabilizes the outputs of (24). However, the link between private
and quantum coding does not hold for more general preprocessing. For instance, [29] studies the effects of
preprocessing using the five qubit code on various Pauli channels. But this cannot be interpreted as a classical
preprocessing for a classical wiretap channel, since in the five qubit code the relative phases of the codewords
play a decisive role, yet they disappear in any classical encoding.
Similar to general additivity questions in quantum Shannon theory, it remains open to quantify the mag-
nitude of how non-additive the private information can become. The results here may shed some light on
the role of degenerate codes in non-additivity. Interestingly, pre-processing based on repetition coding does
not lead to non-additivity for the quantum Bob example, nor does parity encoding lead to non-additivity for
8
the quantum Charlie example. Is this a general trend or just a coincidence? Another interesting question
to resolve is if more capable and less noisy wiretap channels have an additive private information—as they
do in the classical case. More broadly, we might ask how far we can push the question about the quantum-
ness needed to witness non-additivity phenomena in Shannon information theory. A natural candidate that
remains open is to resolve if Marton’s inner bound for general broadcast channels [30] is additive or not
[31]. Insights from quantum information theory as presented here might be able to shine some light on this
long-standing question.
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A Private information in the case of quantum Bob
A.1 Anti-less-noisy
Herewe calculate the second derivative of fW[r]. More precisely, letωX ′BZ =
∑
x pX (x)|x〉〈x |X ′⊗WBZ |X [r] (|x〉〈x |X )
and WBZ |X [r] := BPC(r)/BEC
 
(1− r)2

with q = pX (0). Then fW[r](ρX ) = I(X
′ : B)ω − I(X ′ : E)ω is a func-
tion of q, and we are interested in ∂
2
∂ q2

fW[r](ρX )

. Since the output to Bob is a pure state, in this case we
have
I(X ′ : B)ω − I(X ′ : Z)ω = H(ωB)−H(ωZ ) + h2
 
(1− r)2

. (28)
Thus, we have ∂
2
∂ q2

fW[r](ρX )

= ∂
2
∂ q2
[H(ωB)]− ∂
2
∂ q2
[H(ωZ)]. To evaluate this expression, we will make use
of the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (Second derivative of Shannon entropy).
∂ 2
∂ q2
∑
i
−λi(q) log(λi(q))

= −
∑
i

∂ 2λi(q)
∂ q2

1
ln(2)
+ log(λi(q))

+
1
ln(2)
1
λi(q)

∂ λi(q)
∂ q
2
. (29)
The channel to Charlie is just BEC((1−r)2), whose outputωC is diagonal with probabilities λ0 = q(1−(1−r)2),
λ1 = (1− q)(1− (1− r)2), and (1− r)2. Using Lemma 3 we thus have
∂ 2
∂ q2
[H(ωZ)] = −
1∑
i=0

1
ln(2)
1
λi

∂ λi
∂ q
2
= − (1− (1− r)
2)
ln(2)

1
q
+
1
(1− q)

. (30)
Meanwhile, the channel to Bob is BPC(r), yielding the output state ωB = q|ψ0〉〈ψ0|B +(1− q)|ψ1〉〈ψ1|B ,
where |ψ0〉= |0〉 and |ψ1〉 = r |0〉+
p
1− r2 |1〉. Hence
ωB =

q+ (1− q)r2

|0〉〈0|B + (1− q)(1− r2)|1〉〈1|B + (1− q)r
p
1− r2 [|0〉〈1|B + |1〉〈0|B] . (31)
Via the characteristic polynomial, the eigenvalues are found to beλ± =
1
2 (1± g˜(r,q))with g˜(r,q) =
p
1− 4(1− r2)(q− q2).
It thus follows that
∂
∂ q
λ± = ∓
1
2
2(1− r2)(1− 2q)
g˜(r,q)
and
∂ 2
∂ q2
λ± = ±
1
2
4(1− r2) g˜(r,q)2 − (2(1− r2)(1− 2q))2
g˜(r,q)3
. (32)
Using Lemma 3, we obtain
∂ 2
∂ q2
[H(ωB)]−
∂ 2
∂ q2
[H(ωZ)]
= −

∂ 2λ+
∂ q2

1
ln(2)
+ log(λ+)

+
1
ln(2)
1
λ+

∂ λ+
∂ q
2
−

∂ 2λ−
∂ q2

1
ln(2)
+ log(λ−)

+
1
ln(2)
1
λ−

∂ λ−
∂ q
2
+
(1− (1− r)2)
ln(2)

1
q
+
1
(1− q)

. (33)
We may then rewrite the second derivative in terms of g˜(r,q) as
1
g˜(r,q)2

4(1− r)3(1+ r) + 2r − 1
(1− q)q −
4r2(1− r2) tanh−1( g˜(r,q))
g˜(r,q)

. (34)
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This expression is symmetric in q around q = 12 . In order to find the threshold parameter rˆ, we set q = 1/2,
while setting (34) to zero. Rearranging yields (23). One can then numerically verify that the expression is
positive away from q = 1
2
, thus proving convexity of fW[r](ρX ) for r ≥ rˆ.
A.2 Anti-more-capable
The channel is anti-more-capable when fW[r](ρX ) ≤ 0, i.e. when the naive rate is zero. Again by symmetry
in pX , the uniform distribution is decisive. Setting pX = 1/2 gives H(ωB) = h2(
1
2
(1 − r)), H(ωZ ) = −(1 −
r2) log(1− r2)− (1− (1− r2)) log 1
2
(1− (1− r2)), and therefore the rate expression in (28) is just h2( 12 (1−
r))− (2− r)r.
B Private information in the case of quantum Charlie
Here we calculate the second derivative of fW[p]. LetωX ′YC =
∑
x pX (x)|x〉〈x |X ′⊗WYC |X [p] (|x〉〈x |X )with
WYC |X [p] := BSC(p)/BPC(1− 2p) and pX (0) = q. Again fW[p](ρX ) = I(X ′ : Y )ω − I(X ′ : C)ω is a function of
q, and we are interested in ∂
2
∂ q2

fW[p](ρX )

. Now the output to Charlie is pure, so we have
I(X ′ : Y )ω − I(X ′ : C)ω = H(ωY )−H(ωC )− h2(p) (35)
and hence ∂
2
∂ q2

fW[p](ρX )

= ∂
2
∂ q2
[H(ωY )] − ∂
2
∂ q2
[H(ωC )]. The output to Bob is classical, with probabilities
λ0 = q(1− p) + (1− q)p and λ1 = (1− q)(1− p) + qp. Appealing to Lemma 3 gives
∂ 2
∂ q2
[H(ωY )] = −
1∑
i=0

1
ln(2)
1
λi

∂ λi
∂ q
2
= − (1− 2p)
2
ln(2)

1
q(1− p) + (1− q)p +
1
qp+ (1− q)(1− p)

. (36)
The channel to Charlie is BPC(1−2p), yielding the output state ωC =
∑
x pX (x)|ϕx 〉〈ϕx |C , where |ϕx 〉 =p
1− p |0〉+ (−1)xpp |1〉. In terms of q, the state is
ωC = (1− p)|0〉〈0|C + p|1〉〈1|C + (2q − 1)
Æ
p(1− p)[|0〉〈1|C + |1〉〈0|C ] . (37)
Via the characteristic polynomial, the eigenvalues are found to be λ± =
1
2
(1 ± g(p,q)), with g(p,q) =p
1− 4p(1− p)[1− (2q− 1)2]. It then follows that ∂∂ qλ± = ± 12
8 p(1−p)(2q−1)
g(p,q)
and
∂ 2
∂ q2
λ± = ±
1
2
16 p(1− p)g(p,q)2 − (8p(1− p)(2q − 1))2
g(p,q)3
. (38)
Using Lemma 3, we obtain for the second derivative
∂ 2
∂ q2
[H(ωY )]−
∂ 2
∂ q2
[H(ωC)]
=

∂ 2λ+
∂ q2

1
ln(2)
+ log(λ+)

+
1
ln(2)
1
λ+

∂ λ+
∂ q
2
+

∂ 2λ−
∂ q2

1
ln(2)
+ log(λ−)

+
1
ln(2)
1
λ−

∂ λ−
∂ q
2
− (1− 2p)
2
ln(2)

1
q(1− p) + p(1− q) +
1
qp+ (1− q)(1− p)

. (39)
We may then rewrite the second derivative in terms of c := g2(p,q) = 1− 16p(1− p)q(1− q) as
− 1
log2
·

(1− 2p)2
(q+ p(1− 2q))(1− q− p(1− 2q)) −
4(1− p)p(1− 2q)2
c(1− q)q +
8(1− 2p)2(1− p)p
c3/2
log
1−pc
1+
p
c

.
(40)
Again, this expression is symmetric in q around q = 1
2
. In order to find the threshold parameter pˆ, we set
q = 1
2
, for which the middle term vanishes, leaving just
4
log2
·
2p(1− p) log 1−p
p
− (1− 2p)3
1− 2p . (41)
Setting this to zero and restricting p ∈ [0, 12 ] gives (25). One can then numerically verify that the second
derivative is positive away from q = 12 , thus proving convexity of fW[p](ρX ) for p ≥ pˆ.
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C Lower bound on P(W[p])
We evaluate a lower bound to P0(WYC |X [p]
⊗n ◦PX n |X [q]) by evaluating I(X ′ : Y n)ω− I(X ′ : Cn)ω for a uniform
binary input distribution (to simplify the calculation), such that
ωX ′Y nCn =
1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}
|x〉〈x |X ′ ⊗WYC |X [p]⊗n ◦PX n |X [q] (|x〉〈x |X ) (42)
withWYC |X [p] the BSC(p)/BPC(1− 2p) channel and PX n |X [q] the pre-processing map resulting from the n-bit
repetition encoding followed by i.i.d. bit-flip noise addition at rate q by the sender. Here, X ′ denotes a copy
of the classical input system. Applying the pre-processing map we obtain
ωX ′Y nCn =
1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}
|x〉〈x |X ′ ⊗WYC |X [p]⊗n
 ∑
wn∈{0,1}n
q|w
n⊕(x)×n|(1− q)n−|wn⊕(x)×n||wn〉〈wn|X n
!
, (43)
where (x)×n is either an all-zeros or all-ones bit-string, depending on the value of x and wn denotes the
bit-error pattern on the all-zeros string, and X n denotes the code-block. We can evaluate I(X ′ : Cn)ω by
considering the reduced state ωX ′Cn , where
ωX ′Cn =
1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}
|x〉〈x |X ′ ⊗WC |X [p]⊗n
 ∑
wn∈{0,1}n
q|w
n⊕(x)×n|(1− q)n−|wn⊕(x)×n||wn〉〈wn|X n
!
(44)
forWC |X [p] the BPC(1− 2p)-channel, such thatWC |X [p] (|w〉〈w|X ) = Zw|ϕ0〉〈ϕ0|C Zw for w ∈ {0,1} and Pauli
matrix Z , where |ϕ0〉 =p1− p |0〉+pp |1〉 with p being the channel parameter of the BPC(1− 2p). We thus
have
ωX ′Cn =
1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}
|x〉〈x |X ′ ⊗
∑
wn∈{0,1}n
q|w
n⊕(x)×n|(1− q)n−|wn⊕(x)×n|

n⊗
i=1
Z
wi
Ci
|ϕ0〉〈ϕ0|Ci Z
wi
Ci

(45)
such that Charlie obtains the state
ωCn =
1
2
∑
wn∈{0,1}n
q|w
n|(1− q)n−|wn| + qn−|wn|(1− q)|wn|

n⊗
i=1
Z
wi
Ci
|ϕ0〉〈ϕ0|Ci Z
wi
Ci

. (46)
Since ωX ′Cn is a cq-state, we can evaluate its mutual information as
I(X ′ : Cn)ω = H (ωCn)−
1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}
H
 
ωx
Cn

(47)
where ωx
Cn
is defined as
ωx
Cn
=
∑
wn∈{0,1}n
q|w
n⊕(x)×n|(1− q)n−|wn⊕(x)×n|

n⊗
i=1
Z
wi
Ci
|ϕ0〉〈ϕ0|Ci Z
wi
Ci

(48)
such that ωX ′Cn =
1
2
∑
x∈{0,1} |x〉〈x |X ⊗ωxCn . Notice that ωx⊕1Cn = Z⊗nωxCnZ⊗n and we can thus rewrite ωCn as
ωCn =
1
2
 
ω0
Cn
+ Z⊗nω0
Cn
Z⊗n

. Evaluating I(X ′ : Cn)ω we then have
I(X ′ : Cn)ω = H
 
1
2ω
0
Cn
+ 12 Z
⊗nω0
Cn
Z⊗n

− 12

H
 
ω0
Cn

+H
 
Z⊗nω0
Cn
Z⊗n
	
(49)
= H
 
1
2
ω0
Cn
+ 1
2
Z⊗nω0
Cn
Z⊗n

− H
 
ω0
Cn

, (50)
since H
 
ωx⊕1
Cn

= H
 
ωx
Cn

due to isometric invariance of the von Neumann entropy. Our definition of ω0
Cn
coincides with the definition of ρ⊗m
p,q
:= (1−q)|ϕ+〉〈ϕ+|+q|ϕ−〉〈ϕ−| with |ϕ±〉 =
p
1− p |0〉±p1− p |1〉 from
[3], so that we can write
I(X ′ : Cn)ω = H

1
2
ρ⊗n
p,q
+ 1
2
Z⊗nρ⊗n
p,q
Z⊗n

−H

ρ⊗n
p,q

= H

1
2
ρ⊗n
p,q
+ 1
2
Z⊗nρ⊗n
p,q
Z⊗n

− nH
 
ρp,q

, (51)
since the von Neumann entropy is additive for product states. We now proceed to evaluate I(X ′ : Y n)ω. To
do this, we look at the combination of the BSC(p) with the pre-processing map PX n|X [q]. We can thus write
the state ωX ′Y n as
ωX ′Y n =
1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}
|x〉〈x |X ′ ⊗WY |X [p]⊗n ◦PX n |X [q] (|x〉〈x |X ) (52)
12
= 12
∑
x∈{0,1}
|x〉〈x |X ⊗
∑
wn∈{0,1}n
|(x)×n ⊕wn〉〈(x)×n ⊕wn|Y n(1− p˜)n−|w
n| p˜|w
n | , (53)
whereWY |X [p]
⊗n◦PX n |X [q] is the combined bit-flip channel with bit-flip probability p˜ = q(1−p)+p(1−q), and
p and q are the bit-flip probabilities of the respective channels BSC(p) and pre-processing channels PX n|X [q],
and wn is the bit-flip error pattern occurring on the encoded state |(x)×n〉〈(x)×n|. Equivalently, due to isometric
invariance of the von Neumann entropy, one may first apply the unitary decoding map 1X ′ ⊗ UDY n→V1Sn2 of the
repetition code to the state ωX ′Y n and then evaluate I(X
′ : V1S
n
2
)σ on the resultant state
σX ′V1Sn2 =

1X ′ ⊗ UDY n→V1Sn2

(ωX ′Y n) . (54)
Here, V1 is the first bit of the n-bit repetition code block, and S
n
2
:= (S2, ...,Sn) denotes the set of n − 1
syndrome bits. Implementing the decoding map UD
Y n→V1Sn2
by performing a CNOT gate from Y1 to each of the
bits of Y n
2
= (Y2, ...,Yn) sequentially allows us to write
σX ′V1Sn2 =
1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}
|x〉〈x |X ′ ⊗
∑
w1∈{0,1}
∑
wn2∈{0,1}n−1
|x ⊕w1〉〈x ⊕w1|V1 ⊗ |wn2 ⊕ (w1)×(n−1)〉〈wn2 ⊕ (w1)×(n−1)|Sn2
(1− p˜)m−(|w1 |+|wm2 |) p˜|w1|+|wm2 | , (55)
where (w1)
×(n−1) is a bit-string of length n − 1 that is either all-zeros or all-ones depending on the value of
w1. We now state two observations about the marginals of this state:
Fact 1 (σV1Sn2 is a product state). One may write the state σV1S
n
2
as
σV1Sn2 =
1
2
 
|0〉〈0|V1 + |1〉〈1|V1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
σV1
⊗ 12
∑
wn2∈{0,1}n−1
(1− p˜)n−|wn2 | p˜|wn2|

|wn
2
〉〈wn
2
|Sn2 + |w
n
2
⊕ 1〉〈wn
2
⊕ 1|Sn2
p˜
(1− p˜)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
σSn
2
(56)
= σV1 ⊗σSn2 , (57)
where σV1 is the maximally mixed state on system V1, such that H(V1) = 1.
Fact 2 (σX ′Sn2 is a product state). One may write the state σX ′S
n
2
as
σX ′Sn2 =
 
1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}
|x〉〈x |X ′
!
︸ ︷︷ ︸
σX ′
⊗
 
1
2
∑
w1∈{0,1}
∑
wn2∈{0,1}n−1
(1− p˜)n−|wn| p˜w|wn
2
⊕ (w1)×(n−1)〉〈wn2 ⊕ (w1)×(n−1) |
!
︸ ︷︷ ︸
σSn
2
(58)
= σX ′ ⊗σSn2 . (59)
We can thus evaluate I(X ′ : Y n)ω as
I(X ′ : Y n)ω
= I(X ′ : V1S
n
2
)σ [via isometric invariance of the von Neumann entropy] (60)
= H(V1S
n
2
)σ − H(V1Sn2 |X ′)σ [via definition] (61)
= H(V1)σ +H(S
n
2
)σ −H(V1Sn2 |X ′)σ [via σV1Sn2 = σV1 ⊗σSn2 + chain rule] (62)
= 1+H(Sn
2
)σ − H(V1Sn2 |X )σ [ since σV1 is maximally mixed] (63)
= 1+H(Sn
2
)σ − H(Sn2 |X ′)σ −H(V1|Sn2 ,X ′)σ [via chain rule] (64)
= 1−H(V1|Sn2 ,X ′)σ [via σX ′Sn2 = σX ′ ⊗σSn2 ] (65)
= 1−H(W1 ⊕ X |Sn2 ,X )σ [since V1 =W1 ⊕ X and X ′ = X via definition] (66)
= 1−H(W1|Sn2 )σ (67)
= 1−
∑
sm
2
∈{0,1}n−1
p(sn
2
)H(W1|Sn2 = sn2) . (68)
We thus have I(X ′ : Y n)ω = 1−
∑
sn2∈{0,1}n−1 p(s
n
2
)H(W1|Sn2 = sn2), such that
I(X ′ : Y n)ω − I(X ′ : Cn)ω = 1−
∑
sn
2
∈{0,1}n−1
p(sn
2
)H(W1|Sn2 = sn2)− H

1
2ρ
⊗n
p,q
+ 12 Z
⊗nρ⊗n
p,q
Z⊗n

+ nH
 
ρp,q

. (69)
13
